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COMMENT 
John B. Davis 
Wade Hands has given us a valuable and intriguing account of Frank Knighfs 
methodological thinking, arguing that Knight reasoned much as do contem-
porary 'contextualists l , opposing positivism and scientism about social sci-
ence, and often adopting henneneutical strategies in a social constructivist 
manner that served to emphasize the social character of human knowledge. 
At the same time, Hands notes that Knight's methodological plurahsm was 
accompanied by a theoretical monism. Whereas Knight was a pluralist about 
the various categories of human inquiry, he also held the traditional neoclas-
sical view that economics is the investigation of goal-directed rationality, 
where 'economic laws in any 'very strict and distinctive meaning are reached 
through isolating by abstraction a particular aspect of conduct and ignoring 
much that is quite as real and importanf (Knight, 1946, p. 111). Other ap-
proaches to economic analysis Knight resisted. In particular, Knight was 
often critical of institutionalist thinking which had a much wider following at 
the time when he wrote than it does now. Hands suggests that there may be a 
tensjon here, and indeed some have argued that this is indeed the case 
(McKinney, 1977). r would like to argue that Knight's example - the combi-
nation of a methodological pluralism and theoretical monism - raises inter-
esting questions regarding the nature of pluralism itself. Many, it seems fair 
to say, might suppose that the openness methodological pluralism impJies 
should a]so apply to economic theory. That is, methodological pluralism 
should go hand in hand with theoretical pluralism- Is this the case? 
An important idea behind methodological pluralism is that no single ap-
proach seems fully satisfactory as an explication of economic method, whether 
it is the sort of normative, rule-based approach of the Popperians or rather 
purely descriptive efforts to understand economists' practice of more recent 
vintage (e.g., de Marchi, 1992). Given this, economic methodologists should 
be open to different methodological approaches. A posture of methodological 
openness would then in turn seem to imply the need for an accompanying 
theoretical pluralism, since different methodological strategies are likely to 
give credibility to different kinds of economic theory. One then might be 
termed a theoretical pluralist were one - contra Knight - to believe that 
among the different kinds of economic theory none is superior to all others. 
Differe'nt kinds of theory, it might thus be said, suit different explanatory 
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purposes, and since we have many such purposes, we must also have many 
kinds of economic theo~y. 
A view not unlike this has been expressed by Bruce Caldwell in a discus-
sion of contemporary trends in methodological thinking (1989). Caldwell 
distinguishes between a traditional methodological thinking meant to tease 
out the implications of the philosophy of science· for economics and more 
recent efforts on the part of econoDlic methodologists to explain, the actual 
practice of economists. Methodological pluralism emerges in this new envi-
ronment, because methodologists seenl to be less inclined to impose abstract 
philosophical views on economics, and because they recognize that econo-
mists' practices are not easily reducible to pre-given theoretical categories. 
Indeed, economists' practices often cut across different theoretical approaches. 
Thus methodological work in economics needs to be pluralist, because the 
practical strategies and modes of argument of economists are themselves 
di verse and irreducible to one another. 
I think there is considerable plausibility to this view, but wonder whether 
economists and particularly economic theorists are likely to be as sympa-
thetic to the idea of being pluralistic and openminded in the way that nlany 
economic methodologists have now argued is desirable. Knight is a case in 
point. If we give him the benefit of the doubt, and suppose that he was 
reasonably well aware of the particular combination of postures he embraced ' 
- methodological pluralism and theoretical monism - then we must conclude 
that he likely rejected arguments like the ones advanced above, and thought 
rather that a methodological pluralism should go hand in hand with theoreti-
cal monism. How might he have argued such a thing? 
One might conclude that methodological pluralism goes hand in hand with 
theoretical monism were one to argue as follows. We again say that different 
methodological strategies are likely to give credibility to different types of 
economic theory. Now suppose additionally that different types of economic 
theory are essentially distinct in that they share no substantive concepts or 
principles, while economic theorists deny that no theory is fully adequate. 
Indeed, different economic theorists believe that their own theories are cor-
rect, and that those of others are mistaken. Then, if it is still believed that no 
methodological approaches are fully adequate, economic theorists may be 
both theoretical monists and methodological pluritlists. They accept that there 
is no method for demonstrating the superiority of their own theoretical views, 
but nonetheless continue to believe in that superiority. As Warren Samuels, in 
his contribution to this volume and co-nference, puts -the situation, methodo-
logical pluralism involves not a theoretical tolerance, but rather a practical 
tolerance. Because we do not agree about different types of economic theory, 
we agree to adopt a 'live and let live' strategy at a methodological level, and 
accordingly methodological pluralism only arises in the context of competing 
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theoretical monisms. Ind~ed, were we all lruly theoretical pluralists and 
believed different theories'\411 simultaneously correct, then it seems it would 
\ 
be redundant to call for a methodology of openness in the fust place. 
J'!lis argument, no doubt, may seem counter-intuitive to many. Somehow\ 
if one is open methodologically, one shou1d also be open theoretically. But as 
Hands notes, many of those who are the strongest proponents of methodo-
logical pluralism - heterodox economists - are entirely critical of neoclassi-
cal economics. Their motivation. I would conjecture, is not that their own 
theoretical approaches are also correct - a theoretical pluralist vie~ - but 
rather that neoclassical economics is mistaken and misguided in its most 
basic assumptions, and that their own approaches remedy the deficienc,ies of 
neoclassicism - a theoretical monist view. In practice, then, theor.etical monism 
often seems to accompany methodological pluralism. Heterodox econonllsts 
and neoclassica1 economists dispute the worth of each other's approaches, 
and sometimes also the worth of their associated methodological strategies, 
but tend to maintain an openness on the latter score, because methodological 
disputes appear irresolvable while economic theories are thought distinct and 
non-overlapping. 
Where does Caldwel1 's vjew stand in relation to al1 of thjs? Recall tbat his 
view js focused on practices rather than on the sort of paradigmatic ap-
proaches to theory implicitly referred to above_ Practices, it is probably fair 
to say, can be shared across paradigms, whjch themselves arguably do not 
share substantive concepts and principles. For example, both neo-Ricardian 
and neoclassical theory rely on the practice of reasoning in general equilib-
rium tenns, but are at the same time radically different in that the former uses 
a production-based approach to value, where the latter uses an exchange-
based approach to value. We could of course speak of a theoretical pluralism 
at the level of practices, and in that sense methodological pluralism and 
theoretical pluralism would presumably go hand in hand. But thinking about 
economjc theory usually invo1ves paradigm-specific level concepts and prin-
ciples, and in this sense it seems that the isolation of theories as paradigms 
from one another implies methodological pluralism is better understood as a 
practical tolerance for theoretical intolerance. 
Put in these terms~ however~ we can perhaps begin t~ see how the argument 
that methodologica1 pluralism combined with theoretical monism manages to 
reach its conc1usion. When economists dismiss other economists' paradig-
matic approaches I they often tend to exaggerate those approaches and their 
own as monolithic, tightly structured, self-contained, non-communicating sys-
tems of theorization. They thus lend credibility to the second premise of our 
argument for the methodological pluralism-theoretical monism combination, 
namely~ that different paradigms do not share substantive concepts or princi-
ples. But of course though theories can be represented by assumptions re-
210 Case studies in history and methodology 
garded as paradigm-specific, assumptions also tend to be subject to different 
interpretations. Indeed assumptlons subject to dlfferent interpretations often 
distinguish different camps within broader approaches or paradigms, such as 
when different types of Keynesians are distinguished by competing interpre-
tations of assumptions about labour markets. This suggests that theories or 
paradigms may not really have the self-contained, non-communicating 
character that is needed to drive the Knightian, pluralism-monism argument 
above to its conclusion. If different approaches within paradigms share as-
sumptions differently interpreted, then it is also reasonab1e to think that 
entirely different paradigms share assumptions differently interpreted. On 
this view, paradigms are rarely as distinct as they are often made out to be, so 
that it turns out that the business of describing what theoretical monism 
amounts to is not all that clear. 
I want to suggest that these conclusions point toward an interesting com-
ment on methodological pluralism and pluralism in general. Theoretical monist 
projects of compartmentalizing kinds of theory, it seems, can be said to 
depend upon our having what may be termed identity criteria for individuating 
different paradigms or ctiscourses as distinct and non-communicating. That 
is, just as one distinguishes and differentiates individuals by establishing 
criteria for how we identify and distinguish one person from another j so 
speaking of indlvidual paradigms or discourses in economic theory or other 
disciplines requires that we explain the tenns on which we identify and 
distinguish one paradigm or discourse from another. Can 1t be said that there 
do indeed exist identity conditions for individuating dlscourses from one to 
the next as the Knight position requires? The irony is that in supposing we 
might achieve agreement on identity conditions for individuating discourses 
as seemingly non-communicating we thereby presuppose some shared meta-
discourse j the existence of which yvould itself bring into question the project 
of distinguishing discourses as distinct and non-communicating. And surely 
any shared meta-discourse regarding what distinguishes different paradlgms 
in economics would require a background field of substantive concepts and 
notions common to different paradigms as the principal resource for making 
the distinctions registered between paradigms. Paradigms on this reading 
would then be only relatively distinct, and their -r.on-cornmunication would 
then chjefly be a matter of the practical intolerance of different theorists 
towards each other's different approaches. 
It seems, then, that Knight was mistaken in adopting a strong theoretical 
monist view of economic theory, an~ that he would have done we]] to think 
further about the relationship between methodology and theory. But on the 
argument here this would not imply that one should simply fall back upon the 
methodologicaJ pluralism-theoretical plura1ism poshion first advanced above. 
Indeed, given what has just been argued, there is stil) some truth to Knight's 
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view of the relation between"methodology and theory. First, when theorists 
stress the autonomy and adequ~cy of their respective approaches, they auto-
matically invite methodologists' commentary on identity conditions for para-
digms and encourage the argument that theories are only relatively autono-
mous. Their theoretical monism is thus leavened with an element of plural-
ism. Second, when methodologists emphasize their openness to different 
methodological strategies in regard to the credibility these strategies offer to 
different kinds of theory, they implicitly place themselves in agreement with 
one another on the need to elaborate identity conditions to distinguish differ-
ent kinds of theory., Their methodological pluralism is thus leavened with an 
element of monism. Both theorists and methodologists, that is, really haye 
more hybrid sorts of views than initially appears the case, and this takes us 
beyond both of the views advanced above. 
Is there a straightforward way to characterize this third combination of 
methodology and theory? Methodologists need to be aware that there are 
limits to openness. Theorists need to be aware that there are limits to 
closemindedness. In effect methodological pluralists need to develop rational 
fonns of intolerance, and theorists would be better off being a bit more 
tolerant towards one another. For the former this is a theoretical matter, the 
business of elaborating a shared discourse regarding identity criteria for 
paradigms. For the latter this is a matter of civility and good conduct toward 
others, essentially a practical concern. Our final position thus combines some-
thing of a theoretically intolerant methodological pluralism with a more 
practically tolerant theoretical monism. The first half of this pair sets an 
agenda for future development of methodological pluralism. 
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